ORDERED CONSUMER SEARCH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Armstrong, Mark
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx017
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 989-1024
• 关键词: model; equilibrium; INFORMATION; demand; economies; DESIGN; COSTS

摘要

The paper discusses situations in which consumers search through their options in a deliberate order. Topics include: the existence of ordered search equilibria with symmetric sellers (all consumers first inspect the seller they anticipate will set the lowest price, and a seller that is inspected first by consumers will set the lowest price); the use of price and non-price advertising to direct search; how purchase history can guide future search; and the incentive a seller can have to raise its own search cost. I also show how ordered search can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions.