WHEN THE STATE MIRRORS THE FAMILY: THE DESIGN OF PENSION SYSTEMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galasso, Vincenzo; Profeta, Paola
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx046
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1712-1763
• 关键词: culture; Europe; institutions; TRANSITION; fertility; DYNAMICS

摘要

We study how family culture has affected the adoption and generosity of public pension systems. Our theoretical framework suggests that inheritance rules shape filial obligations to parents, and thus the within-family intergenerational transmission of resources. In countries with egalitarian inheritance rules, inheriting children represent a large share of the population, and support generous pension systems; in countries with nonegalitarian inheritance rules, a majority of noninheriting individuals prefer basic pension systems. An empirical cross-country analyses using historical data on inheritance rules support these predictions. These results are robust to controlling for alternative legal, religious, demographic, economic, and political explanations. Evidence from individual (General Social Survey) data confirms our findings: US citizens whose ancestors came from countries featuring egalitarian inheritance rules rely more on the government as a provider of old age security income.