EFFICIENCY VERSUS EQUALITY IN BARGAINING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galeotti, Fabio; Montero, Maria; Poulsen, Anders
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy030
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1941-1970
• 关键词: Focal points; inequality aversion; social preferences; INFORMATION; uncertainty; games

摘要

We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.