CAN BUREAUCRATS REALLY BE PAID LIKE CEOS? SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN INCENTIVES AND RESOURCES AMONG SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS IN CHINA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Luo, Renfu; Miller, Grant; Rozelle, Scott; Sylvia, Sean; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos
• 署名单位: Peking University; Stanford University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy047
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 165-201
• 关键词: performance pay; anemia prevalence; health-services; iron-deficiency; low-income; teachers; IMPACT; child; motivation; QUALITY

摘要

Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia-as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.