PAY TO QUIT AND TEAM INCENTIVES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Au, Pak Hung
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 964-1008
• 关键词: organizational citizenship behavior; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; bad apples; performance; turnover; WORKPLACE; COMPENSATION; CONSEQUENCES; satisfaction; strategy

摘要

This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.