KNOWLEDGE AS PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE RATCHET EFFECT OF INNOVATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tan, Teck Yong
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz056
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2677-2714
• 关键词: incentive problems; starting small; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; INVESTMENT; DELEGATION; management; OWNERSHIP; COSTS

摘要

This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under reduced oversight, a worker accrues private knowledge about his innovation, which serves as a substitute for its inalienable property rights. The resulting asymmetric information generates an information rent for the worker, which feeds back as an innovation incentive ex ante. A weak early production incentive is required to complement it. Innovations are generally underutilized ex post, and mildly successful innovations are not distinguished from failed innovation attempts.