Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferraz, Claudio; Finan, Frederico; Martinez-Bravo, Monica
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae033
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2870-2908
• 关键词: electoral competition; institutions; GOVERNMENT; DEMOCRACY; POLICY; responsiveness; performance; persistence; PARTIES; HISTORY

摘要

This paper analyzes how changes in the concentration of political power affect long-run development. We study Brazil's military dictatorship whose rise to power dramatically altered the distribution of power of local political elites. We document that municipalities that were more politically concentrated prior to the dictatorship in the 1960s are relatively richer in 2000, despite being poorer initially. Our evidence suggests that this reversal of fortune was the result of the military's policies aimed at undermining the power of traditional elites. These policies increased political competition among traditional elites, leading to better governance, more public goods, and higher income levels.