The Return of Greenspan: Mumbling with Great Incoherence

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ou, Shengliang; Zhang, Donghai; Zhang, Renbin
• 署名单位: Shanghai Jiao Tong University; National University of Singapore; Shandong University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaf017
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: optimal monetary-policy; central bank transparency; social value; sticky prices; INFORMATION; shocks; COMMUNICATION; expectations; aggregate; RIGIDITY

摘要

This study demonstrates that more information about the unobserved state of the economy may reduce social welfare owing to the presence of nominal rigidity. On one hand, costly business cycle fluctuations and price dispersions arising from nominal rigidity are muted in a noisy economy. On the other hand, an economy with less information suffers from efficiency losses due to inefficient coordination in pricing decisions. Monetary policy affects the tradeoff, and thus interacts with the social value of information. We characterize the conditions under which more information reduces social welfare. Our findings are relevant for optimal central bank communication strategies and for evaluating the social benefit of new technologies, such as AI technology, that reduce the cost of information acquisition.