Bank Capital Regulation in a Zero Interest Environment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dottling, Robin
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae048
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1028-1059
• 关键词: real interest-rates; risk-taking; monetary-policy; liquidity trap; COMPETITION; requirements

摘要

How does the zero lower bound on deposit rates (ZLB) affect how banks respond to capital regulation? I study this question in a model in which households value the liquidity services of deposits yet do not accept negative deposit rates. When deposit rates are constrained by the ZLB, tight capital requirements disproportionately hurt franchise values and are therefore less effective in curbing excessive risk taking. The model delivers a novel rationale for interest-dependent capital regulation that is optimally laxer when the ZLB binds and tighter when the ZLB is slack but may bind in the future.