Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rodemeier, Matthias; Loeschel, Andreas
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Ruhr University Bochum
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae058
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1397-1430
• 关键词: consumer inattention; SALIENCE; perceptions; taxation; POLICY

摘要

How can information substitute or complement financial incentives such as Pigouvian subsidies? We answer this question in a large-scale field experiment that cross-randomizes energy efficiency subsidies with information about the financial savings of LED lighting. Information has two effects: It shifts and rotates demand curves. The direction of the shift is ambiguous and highly dependent on the information design. Informing consumers that an LED saves 90% in annual energy costs increases LED demand, but showing them that 90% corresponds to an average of 11 raises demand for less efficient technologies. The rotation of the demand curve is unambiguous: Information dramatically reduces both own-price and cross-price elasticities, which makes subsidies less effective. The uniform decrease in price elasticities suggests that consumers pay less attention to subsidies when information is provided. We structurally estimate that welfare-maximizing subsidies can be 200% larger than the Pigouvian benchmark when combined with information.