HOW TO DISCIPLINE FINANCIAL MARKETS: REPUTATION IS NOT ENOUGH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bigoni, Maria; Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae055
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1479-1520
• 关键词: fiat money; credence goods; BANK; COMPETITION; strategies

摘要

Historically, shocks originating in the financial sector often spilled over into the real sector with dramatic consequences. We study in the lab how interventions targeting disclosure and capital requirements of financial intermediaries can reduce insolvencies or prevent their negative effects from propagating to the broader economy. In our two-sector economy, consumers and producers can fund financial intermediaries, who, in turn, provide them with liquidity to settle trades. However, intermediaries may undertake risky investments and become insolvent, which depresses real economic activity. In the experiment, insolvencies were frequent. As a consequence, consumers and producers often refused to fund intermediaries, which lowered the trade volume. Imposing the disclosure of risky investments did not reduce risk-taking and insolvencies. Instead, imposing capital requirements prevented insolvencies from disrupting real economic activity, thus boosting financial intermediation and trade.