Contracting for Coordination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaf015
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 815-844
• 关键词: externalities; incentives; demand

摘要

A principal contracts with agents to achieve coordination. Multiple equilibria can in general arise under given contract offers, and the principal wishes to maximize her payoff guarantee across equilibrium outcomes. I discuss recent work on contracting for coordination using a simple, unifying framework. The analysis reveals how the principal's concern for strategic uncertainty shapes optimal contracts, with implications for discrimination and inequality between agents. I adapt the framework to various settings-including contractible actions, hidden actions, and hidden information-and highlight the relevance of contracting for coordination in applications-including adoption and investment, team incentives, and goods with network externalities.