Economic Growth in a Cooperative Economy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brzustowski, Thomas; Caselli, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of Essex; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae050
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 845-890
• 关键词: illyrian firm; LABOR; equilibrium; management; optimality; games

摘要

We develop and formalise an equilibrium concept for a dynamic economy in which production takes place in worker cooperatives. The concept rules out allocations of workers to cooperatives in which a worker in one cooperative could move to a different cooperative and make both herself and the existing workers in the receiving cooperative better off. It also rules out allocations in which workers in a cooperative would be made better off by some of the other workers leaving. We also provide a minimum-information equilibrium-selection criterion, which refines our equilibrium concept. We illustrate the application of our concept and refinement in the context of an overlapping-generation economy with specific preferences and technology. The cooperative economy follows a dynamic path qualitatively similar to the path followed by a capitalist economy, featuring gradual convergence to a steady state with constant output. However, the cooperative economy features a static inefficiency, in that, for a given aggregate capital stock, firm size is smaller than what a social planner would choose. On the other hand, the cooperative economy cannot be dynamically inefficient and could accumulate capital at a rate that is higher or lower than the capitalist economy. As a result, steady-state income per worker could be higher or lower in the cooperative economy. We also present an illustrative calibration, which quantitatively compares steady-state incomes and welfare in a cooperative and in a capitalist economy. (JEL: J54, O43)