College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carvalho, Jose Raimundo; Magnac, Thierry; Xiong, Qizhou
• 署名单位: Universidade Federal do Ceara; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE951
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1233-1277
• 关键词: education; two-sided matching; school allocation mechanism; Policy Evaluation; C57; D47; I21

摘要

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.