Bandits in the lab

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoelzemann, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE1389
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1021-1051
• 关键词: Dynamic public-good problem; strategic experimentation; exponential bandits; learning; dynamic games; laboratory experiments; C73; C92; D83; O32

摘要

We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.