Mergers, cartels, set-asides, and bidding preferences in asymmetric oral auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brannman, L; Froeb, LM
• 署名单位: Ministry of Education & Science of Ukraine; National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/003465300558795
• 发表日期: 2000-05
• 页码: 283-290
• 关键词: competition; collusion

摘要

From bidding data, we estimate the underlying value distribution for Forest Service timber. We find that bidder values decrease $2/mbf (thousand board feet) with each mile from the tract and that small firms (fewer than 500 employees) have values that are $72/mbf lower than large firms. The empirical value distribution is used to simulate various hypothetical scenarios designed to inform public policy. The most anticompetitive mergers raise price by less than 3%, and a 4% decline in marginal costs through greater merger efficiencies is enough to offset a 1% anticompetitive price increase. Eliminating the SBA set-aside program would raise timber revenues by 15%. A policy of granting bidding preferences to small and more-distant bidders would raise revenue by approximately one-tenth of one percent.