How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bardhan, Pranab; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Nath, Anusha
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Boston University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE2315
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 655-697
• 关键词: Clientelism; public goods; voting; welfare programs; H40; H75; H76; O10; P48

摘要

Using rural household survey data from West Bengal, we find that voters respond positively to excludable government welfare benefits but not to local public good programs, while reporting having benefited from both. Consistent with these voting patterns, shocks to electoral competition induced by exogenous redistricting of villages resulted in upper-tier governments manipulating allocations across local governments only for excludable benefit programs. Using a hierarchical budgeting model, we argue these results provide credible evidence of the presence of clientelism rather than programmatic politics.