An ordinal approach to the empirical analysis of games with monotone best responses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lazzati, Natalia; Quah, John K. -H.; Shirai, Koji
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; National University of Singapore; Kwansei Gakuin University
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE2192
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 235-266
• 关键词: Revealed preference; monotone comparative statics; single-crossing differences; supermodular games; revealed monotonicity axiom; C1; C6; c7; D4; L1

摘要

We develop a nonparametric and ordinal approach for testing pure strategy Nash equilibrium play in games with monotone best responses, such as those with strategic complements/substitutes. The approach makes minimal assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity, requires no parametric assumptions on payoff functions, and no restriction on equilibrium selection from multiple equilibria. The approach can also be extended in order to make inferences and predictions. Both model-testing and inference can be implemented by a tractable computation procedure based on column generation. To illustrate how our approach works, we include an application to an IO entry game.