An experimental study of decentralized matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Robinson-Cortes, Alejandro; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Exeter; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE2316
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 497-533
• 关键词: Decentralized matching; experiments; market design; C78; C92; D47

摘要

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary nonbinding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights emerge. First, stable outcomes are prevalent. Second, while centralized clearinghouses commonly aim at implementing extremal stable matchings, our decentralized markets most frequently culminate in the median stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners with whom participants match. Last, the dynamics underlying our results exhibit strategic sophistication, with agents successfully avoiding cycles of blocking pairs.