Why cooperate? Public goods, economic power, and the Montreal Protocol

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beron, KJ; Murdoch, JC; Vijverberg, WPM
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/003465303765299819
• 发表日期: 2003-05
• 页码: 286-297
• 关键词: simulation; provision; chlorine; sink

摘要

This paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public-goods component or same other forms of interdependency. The key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents. In particular, we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Specifically, we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the Protocol, and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners. Hence, the data suggest that, with respect to the Montreal Protocol, most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations.