Multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard: An empirical study of National Football League contract negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conlin, M; Emerson, PM
• 署名单位: Syracuse University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/003465303322369885
• 发表日期: 2003-08
• 页码: 760-765
• 关键词: asymmetric information model; product quality; strikes

摘要

This paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts. Using contract and performance data on players drafted into the National Football League from 1986 through 1991, we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations. In addition, our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player's effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract.