Employment efficiency and sticky wages: Evidence from flows in the labor market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hall, RE
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/0034653054638346
• 发表日期: 2005-08
• 页码: 397-407
• 关键词: equilibrium; unemployment

摘要

I consider three views of the labor market. In the first, wages are flexible and employment follows the principle of bilateral efficiency. Workers never lose their jobs because of sticky wages. In the second, wages are sticky and inefficient layoffs do occur. In the third, wages are also sticky, but employment governance is efficient. I show that the behavior of flows in the labor market strongly favors the third view. In the modern U. S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs. Unemployment rises because jobs are hard to find, not because an unusual number of people are thrown into unemployment.