Contracts, externalities, and incentives in shopping malls

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gould, ED; Pashigian, BP; Prendergast, CJ
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/0034653054638355
• 发表日期: 2005-08
• 页码: 411-422
• 关键词: southern agriculture; moral hazard; RISK; CHOICE; SPACE

摘要

This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, whereas many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of other stores, and the effort of the developer to attract customers to the mall. Using a unique data set of mall tenant contracts, we show that rental contracts are written to ( i) efficiently price the net externality of each store and ( ii) align the incentives to induce optimal effort by the developer and each mall store according to the externality of each store's effort.