CORRUPTION AND BILATERAL TRADE FLOWS: EXTORTION OR EVASION?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutt, Pushan; Traca, Daniel
• 署名单位: Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00034
• 发表日期: 2010-11
• 页码: 843-860
• 关键词: gravity equation; ENFORCEMENT; TARIFFS

摘要

We analyze the impact of corruption on bilateral trade, highlighting its dual role in terms of extortion and evasion. Corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the importing country extort bribes from exporters (extortion effect); however, with high tariffs, corruption may be trade enhancing when corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (evasion effect). We derive and estimate a comiption-augmented gravity model, where the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and contingent on tariffs. Empirically, corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high-tariff environments (covering 5% to 14% of the observations) their marginal effect is trade enhancing.