FRIEND OR FOE? COOPERATION AND LEARNING IN HIGH-STAKES GAMES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oberholzer-Gee, Felix; Waldfogel, Joel; White, Matthew W.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest.2009.10174
• 发表日期: 2010-02
• 页码: 179-187
• 关键词: natural experiment; RISK; preferences; incentives; PUNISHMENT; fairness; monetary

摘要

Why do people frequently cooperate in defiance of their immediate incentives? One explanation is that individuals are conditionally cooperative. As an explanation of behavior in one-shot settings, such preferences require individuals to be able to discern their opponents' preferences. Using data from a television game show, we provide evidence about how individuals implement conditionally cooperative preferences. We show that contestants forgo large sums of money to be cooperative; they cooperate at heightened levels when their opponents are predictably cooperative; and they fare worse when their observable characteristics predict less cooperation because opponents avoid cooperating with them.