Decentralization, Collusion, and Coal Mine Deaths

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jia, Ruixue; Nie, Huihua
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00563
• 发表日期: 2017-03
• 页码: 105-118
• 关键词: fiscal decentralization; FEDERALISM; trust; incentives; CORRUPTION; media; CHINA

摘要

This paper investigates how collusion between regulators and firms affects workplace safety using the case of China's coal mine deaths. We argue that decentralization makes collusion more likely and that its effect is strengthened if the transaction costs of collusion are lower. These hypotheses are tested by investigating the impact of decentralization contingent on regulators' characteristics. Exploring both decentralization and centralization reforms in the coal mine industry, we find that decentralization is correlated with an increase in coal mine death rates. Moreover, this increase in mortality is larger for the regulators with lower transaction costs (proxied by the locality of origin).