Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Microlevel Application Data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frakes, Michael D.; Wasserman, Melissa F.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00605
• 发表日期: 2017-07
• 页码: 550-563
• 关键词: incentive contracts; trademark office; us patent; matter

摘要

We explore how examiner behavior is altered by the time allocated for reviewing patent applications. Insufficient examination time may hamper examiner search and rejection efforts, leaving examiners more inclined to grant invalid applications. To test this prediction, we use application-level data to trace the behavior of individual examiners over the course of a series of promotions that carry with them reductions in examination time allocations. We find evidence demonstrating that such promotions are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and increases in granting tendencies, as well as evidence that those additional patents being issued on the margin are of below-average quality.