A Field Experiment in Motivating Employee Ideas

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gibbs, Michael; Neckermann, Susanne; Siemroth, Christoph
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Essex
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00631
• 发表日期: 2017-10
• 页码: 577-590
• 关键词: intrinsic motivation; creativity; incentives; rewards; ORGANIZATIONS; performance; leadership; INNOVATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We study a field experiment at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements. The company randomly assigned nineteen teams into treatment and control groups. Treatment team employees received rewards if their ideas were approved. Nothing changed for control team employees. Our main finding is that rewards substantially increased the quality of ideas. Rewards increased participation in the suggestion system but decreased ideas per participating employee, with no net effect on the quantity of ideas. Broader participation persisted after the reward was discontinued, suggesting habituation. We find no evidence for motivational crowding out.