Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo
• 署名单位: Duke University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00659
• 发表日期: 2018-03
• 页码: 187-202
• 关键词: us monetary-policy; macroeconomic fluctuations; general equilibrium; regime switches; models; expectations; inflation; CONVERGENCE; uncertainty; INFORMATION

摘要

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization, and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur, agents' uncertainty about the macroeconomy remains contained, and welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, uncertainty eventually accelerates and welfare declines. Announcing that inflation stabilization will be temporarily abandoned raises uncertainty. However, these announcements lower policy uncertainty and curb inflationary beliefs at the end of the policy. For the United States, enhancing transparency raises welfare.