Accountability and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hessami, Zohal
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00684
• 发表日期: 2018-03
• 页码: 51-64
• 关键词: political business-cycle; electoral accountability; budget cycles; term limits; POLICY; GOVERNMENT; MODEL; bureaucrats; ELECTIONS; expenditures

摘要

Political agency models suggest that elected public officials choose different policies than appointed officials do. This paper is the first (a) to apply a clean empirical design to study whether the selection rule has a causal effect on public officials' policy choices and (b) to investigate transmission channels. I exploit a unique setting in Germany, where a reform has created quasi-experimental variation in the selection rule for mayors. As the outcome variable, I use data on grant receipts for highly visible investment projects for which mayors must apply to the state government. Elected mayors attract 7% to 7.4% more grants in election years; for appointed mayors, there is no cycle. Using hand-collected data on mayor characteristics, I find suggestive evidence that although the selection of mayors changes following the reform studied, a likely reason for the observed cycle is that elected mayors have stronger electoral incentives.