Contracting between Firms: Empirical Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iyer, Rajkamal; Sautner, Zacharias
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00648
• 发表日期: 2018-03
• 页码: 92-104
• 关键词: interfirm relationships; incomplete contracts; vertical integration; COSTS; governance; OWNERSHIP; ECONOMICS; industry; equity

摘要

We analyze contracts between a large buyer and her suppliers. We find that contracts with critical product suppliers contain more clauses that address moral hazard, primarily through monitoring. If holdup concerns are larger, there are more contractual protections against it. Over time, contracts with the same supplier include additional provisions that address moral hazard through monitoring. This dynamic effect is strongest for service contracts, where observability and verifiability are initially lower. Our findings indicate that contracts become more complete over time and provide support to incomplete-contracting models that argue that contracts become more complete as contracting costs decrease.