Information Frictions and Adverse Selection: Policy Interventions in Health Insurance Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Handel, Benjamin R.; Kolstad, Jonathan T.; Spinnewijn, Johannes
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00773
• 发表日期: 2019-05
• 页码: 326-340
• 关键词: plan choice; welfare; COMPETITION

摘要

Despite evidence that many consumers in health insurance markets are subject to information frictions, approaches used to evaluate these markets typically assume informed, active consumers. We develop a general framework to study insurance market equilibrium in the presence of choice frictions and evaluate key policy interventions. We identify sufficient relationships between the underlying distributions of consumer costs, surplus from risk protection, and choice frictions that determine the welfare impact of friction-reducing policies. We implement our approach empirically, showing how these key sufficient objects can be measured and the link between these objects and policy outcomes.