An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Universidad de Malaga; University of Cologne; Max Planck Society; University of Innsbruck
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01150
• 发表日期: 2023-11
• 页码: 1530-1543
• 关键词: coordination; induction; COOPERATION

摘要

We examine how preplay communication and clustering affect play in a challenging hybrid experimental game on networks. Free-form chat is impressively effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome, but restricted communication has little effect. We support this result with a model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. We also offer a model of message diffusion that correctly predicts more rapid diffusion without clustering. We show an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. A remarkable result is that restricted communication is quite effective in a network stag hunt but not in our extended game.