Who Opts In? Composition Effects and Disappointment from Participation Payments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambuehl, Sandro; Ockenfels, Axel; Stewart, Colin
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; University of Cologne; Max Planck Society; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01268
• 发表日期: 2025-01
• 页码: 78-94
• 关键词: rational inattention; CHOICE; motivation; constraint

摘要

Participation payments are used in many transactions about which people know little but can learn more: incentives for medical trial participation, signing bonuses for job applicants, or price rebates on consumer durables. Who opts into the transaction when given such incentives? We theoretically and experimentally identify a composition effect whereby incentives disproportionately increase participation among those for whom learning is harder. Moreover, these individuals use less information to decide whether to participate, which makes disappointment more likely. The learning-based composition effect is stronger in settings in which information acquisition is more difficult.