Selecting Top Bureaucrats: Admission Exams and Performance in Brazil

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dahis, Ricardo; Schiavon, Laura; Scot, Thiago
• 署名单位: Monash University; Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01311
• 发表日期: 2025-03
• 页码: 408-425
• 关键词: financial incentives; management matter; PRODUCTIVITY; patronage; FIRMS; pay

摘要

In the absence of strong incentives, public service delivery is crucially dependent on bureaucrat selection. Despite wide adoption by governments, it is unclear whether civil service examinations reliably select for job performance. We investigate this question focusing on state judges in Brazil. Exploring monthly data on judicial output and cross-court movement, we estimate that judges account for at least 23% of the observed variation in the number of cases disposed. With novel data on admission examinations, we show that judges with higher grades perform better than lower-ranked peers. Our results suggest competitive examinations can be an effective way to screen candidates.