Influence-Seeking in US Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Teso, Edoardo
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Bocconi University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01321
• 发表日期: 2025-05
• 页码: 685-696
• 关键词: money

摘要

I leverage a new panel on the contributions to members of the U.S. Congress (MCs) from 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over 1999-2018 to show that U.S. corporate elites use contributions to political campaigns as a tool of political influence. Donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader's company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. I estimate that, absent an influence motive, donations from corporate leaders during this period would have been lower by $20 million.