Can Whistleblowers Root Out Public Expenditure Fraud? Evidence from Medicare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leder-Luis, Jetson
• 署名单位: Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01339
• 发表日期: 2025-09
• 页码: 1169-1186
• 关键词: private enforcement; ECONOMICS; LAW; doctors

摘要

This paper analyzes private antifraud enforcement under the False Claims Act, which compensates whistleblowers for litigating against health care providers who overbill the US government. I conduct several case studies of successful whistleblower lawsuits concerning Medicare fraud, pairing new legal data with large samples of Medicare claims. I estimate that deterrence from $1.9 billion in whistleblower settlements generated Medicare cost savings of nearly $19 billion, while imposing low costs on the government. These results suggest private enforcement is a cost-effective way to combat public expenditure fraud.