Financing Municipal Water and Sanitation Services in Nairobi's Informal Settlements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coville, Aidan; Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul; Yoshida, Susumu
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01379
• 发表日期: 2025-09
• 页码: 1215-1232
• 关键词: field experiment; infrastructure; electricity; audit; INDIA

摘要

We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.