Public Leaderboard Feedback in Sampling Competition: An Experimental Investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hudja, Stanton; Roberson, Brian; Rosokha, Yaroslav
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01259
• 发表日期: 2025-03
• 页码: 555-569
• 关键词: performance feedback; contests; INNOVATION; DESIGN; tournaments; aversion; seeking; RISK; pay

摘要

We investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in a sequential-sampling contest with costly observations. We show theoretically that for contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback may result in fewer expected observations and a lower expected value of the winning observation. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, we investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive sequential-sampling activity.